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Auction Papers



Recent Highlights

NEW! “Efficient Procurement Auctions with Increasing Returns” (with Oleg Baranov, Christina Aperjis and Thayer Morrill), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, forthcoming (311 KB)

NEW! “A Practical Guide to the Combinatorial Clock Auction” (with Oleg Baranov), Economic Journal, forthcoming (566 KB)

“Market Design and the Evolution of the Combinatorial Clock Auction” (with Oleg Baranov), American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings, Vol. 104, No. 5, pp. 456-451, May 2014 (476 KB)

“Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions” (with Peter Cramton, Marek Pycia, Marzena Rostek and Marek Weretka), Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 81, No. 4, pp. 1366-1400, Dec. 2014 (564 KB)

“Sequential Kidney Exchange” (with Thayer Morrill), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Vol. 6, No. 3, pp. 265-285, August 2014 (1700 KB)

“An Enhanced Combinatorial Clock Auction” (with Oleg Baranov), working paper coming soon; PowerPoint Presentation available now (197 KB)

“Core-Selecting Auctions with Incomplete Information” (with Oleg Baranov), working paper, August 2010 (189 KB)

“Virtual Power Plant Auctions” (with Peter Cramton), Utilities Policy, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 201-208, December 2010 (135 KB)

“Using Forward Markets to Improve Electricity Market Design” (with Peter Cramton), Utilities Policy, Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 195-200, December 2010 (113 KB)

“Common-Value Auctions with Liquidity Needs: An Experimental Test of a Troubled Assets Reverse Auction” (with Peter Cramton, Emel Filiz-Ozbay, Nathaniel Higgins, Erkut Ozbay and Andrew Stocking), working paper, May 2009.  (526 KB)

“A Two-Sided Auction for Legacy Loans” (with Peter Cramton), working paper, March 2009 (172 KB)

“No Substitute for the 'P'-Word in Financial Rescue” (with Peter Cramton), Economists' Voice, Vol. 6, Issue 2, Article 2, February 2009. http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol6/iss2/art2  (144 KB)

“Making Sense of the Aggregator Bank” (with Peter Cramton), Economists' Voice, Vol. 6, Issue 3, Article 2, February 2009. http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol6/iss3/art2  (165 KB)

“A Troubled Asset Reverse Auction” (with Peter Cramton), working paper, October 2008 (104 KB) and PowerPoint Presentation (158 KB)

“Addendum -- Auctions for Injecting Bank Capital” (with Peter Cramton), working paper, October 2008.  (28 KB)

“Auction Design Critical for Rescue Plan” (with Peter Cramton), Economists' Voice, Vol. 5, Issue 5, Article 5, September 2008. http://www.bepress.com/ev/vol5/iss5/art5  (135 KB)

 

The Theory of Multiple-Item Auctions

“An Efficient Dynamic Auction for Heterogeneous Commodities,” American Economic Review, Vol. 96, No. 3, pp. 602-629, June 2006.  (228 KB)

“An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects,” American Economic Review, Vol. 94, No. 5, pp. 1452-1475, December 2004.  (196 KB)

“Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions” (with Peter Cramton, Marek Pycia, Marzena Rostek and Marek Weretka), Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 81, No. 4, pp. 1366-1400, Dec. 2014 (564 KB)

“Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding” (with Paul Milgrom), Frontiers of Theoretical Economics: Vol. 1: No. 1, Article 1, 2002. http://www.bepress.com/bejte/frontiers/vol1/iss1/art1   (640 KB)

“Auctioning Many Divisible Goods” (with Peter Cramton), Journal of the European Economic Association, April-May 2004, Vol. 2, Nos. 2-3, pp. 480-493.  (151 KB)

The Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction (with Paul Milgrom), Chapter 1 in P. Cramton, Y. Shoham, and R. Steinberg (eds.), Combinatorial Auctions, MIT Press, 2006.  (220 KB)

Ascending Proxy Auctions (with Paul Milgrom), Chapter 3 in P. Cramton, Y. Shoham, and R. Steinberg (eds.), Combinatorial Auctions, MIT Press, 2006.  (215 KB)

The Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design,” (with Peter Cramton and Paul Milgrom), Chapter 5 in P. Cramton, Y. Shoham, and R. Steinberg (eds.), Combinatorial Auctions, MIT Press, 2006.  (114 KB)

 

Other Papers

“Implications of Auction Theory for New Issues Markets,” Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services, 2002, pp. 313-343.  (124 KB)

“Put Corruption Under the Hammer,” Financial Times Op-Ed, 20 December 2002.

“An Efficient Dynamic Auction for Heterogeneous Commodities,” (first draft circulated as “An Efficient Dynamic Auction II”), working paper, University of Maryland, 8 September 2000.  (192 KB)

“A Generalized Vickrey Auction,” Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of Maryland, September 1999.  (57 KB)

“The Ascending Auction Paradox” (with Jesse Schwartz), Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of Maryland, July 1999.  (121 KB)

“The Optimality of Being Efficient” (with Peter Cramton), Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of Maryland, June 1999.  (124 KB)

“Vickrey Auctions with Reserve Pricing” (with Peter Cramton), Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of Maryland, June 1999, forthcoming, Economic Theory.  (74 KB)

“Auctioning Securities” (with Peter Cramton), Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of Maryland, March 1998.  (53 KB)

“On Generalizing the English Auction,” Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of Maryland, December 1997.  (57 KB).  Superceded by “Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding” (with Paul Milgrom).

“Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions” (with Peter Cramton, R. Preston McAfee, and John McMillan),  Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Vol. 6, No. 3, Fall 1997, pp. 497-527.  (892 KB)

“An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects,” Working Paper No. 97-06, Department of Economics, University of Maryland, June 1997.  (207 KB)

“Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions” (with Peter Cramton), revision, 12 July 2002.  (239 KB)

“Demand Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions” (with Peter Cramton), Working Paper No. 96-07, Department of Economics, University of Maryland, July 1996.  (154 KB)

“An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Dissimilar Objects,” Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of Maryland, January 1996.  (66 KB)

“Insider Trading in a Rational Expectations Economy,” American Economic Review, Vol. 80, No. 5, December 1990, pp. 1022-1041.


Patents

“System and Method for an Efficient Dynamic Multi-Unit Auction,” U.S. Patent Number 7,165,046, issued 16 January 2007.  (1,767 KB)

“System and Method for an Efficient Dynamic Multi-Unit Auction,” U.S. Patent Number 7,062,461, issued 13 June 2006.  (1,660 KB)

“System and Method for an Efficient Dynamic Auction for Multiple Objects,” U.S. Patent Number 6,026,383, issued 15 Feb 2000. (918 KB)

“Computer Implemented Methods and Apparatus for Auctions,” U.S. Patent Number 6,021,398, issued 1 Feb 2000, this file only contains the pages that differ from the 5,905,975 patent.  (433 KB)

“Computer Implemented Methods and Apparatus for Auctions,” U.S. Patent Number 5,905,975, issued 18 May 1999.  (709 KB)


2017 Lawrence M. Ausubel