Recent Highlights NEW!
“An
Efficient Dynamic Auction for Heterogeneous Commodities,” American Economic Review,
Vol. 96, No. 3, pp. 602-629, June 2006. (228 KB)
“An
Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects,” American Economic Review,
Vol. 94, No. 5, pp. 1452-1475, December 2004.
(196 KB)
“Ascending
Auctions with Package Bidding” (with Paul
Milgrom), Frontiers of Theoretical Economics: Vol. 1: No. 1, Article
1. http://www.bepress.com/bejte/frontiers/vol1/iss1/art1
(640 KB)
“Auctioning
Many Divisible Goods” (with Peter
Cramton), Journal of the European Economic Association, April-May 2004, Vol.
2, Nos. 2-3, pp. 480-493. (151 KB)
“The
Lovely but Lonely Vickrey Auction” (with Paul
Milgrom), Chapter 1 in P. Cramton, Y. Shoham, and R. Steinberg (eds.),
Combinatorial Auctions, MIT Press, 2006. (220 KB)
“Ascending
Proxy Auctions” (with Paul
Milgrom), Chapter 3 in P. Cramton, Y. Shoham, and R. Steinberg (eds.),
Combinatorial Auctions, MIT Press, 2006. (215 KB)
“The
Clock-Proxy Auction: A Practical Combinatorial Auction Design,” (with
Peter
Cramton and Paul
Milgrom), Chapter 5 in P. Cramton, Y. Shoham, and R. Steinberg (eds.),
Combinatorial Auctions, MIT Press, 2006. (114 KB)
“Demand
Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions” (with
Peter
Cramton), revision, 12 July 2002. (239 KB)
“Put
Corruption Under the Hammer,” Financial Times Op-Ed, 20 December 2002.
Other Papers
“Implications
of Auction Theory for New Issues Markets,” Brookings-Wharton
Papers on Financial Services, 2002, pp. 313-343. (124 KB)
“An
Efficient Dynamic Auction for Heterogeneous Commodities,” (first draft
circulated as “An Efficient Dynamic Auction II”), working paper, University of
Maryland, 8 September 2000. (192 KB)
“A
Generalized Vickrey Auction,” Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of
Maryland, September 1999. (57 KB)
“The
Ascending Auction Paradox” (with Jesse Schwartz), Working Paper,
Department of Economics, University of
Maryland, July 1999. (121 KB)
“The Optimality of
Being Efficient” (with Peter
Cramton),
Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of Maryland, June 1999.
(124 KB)
“Vickrey
Auctions with Reserve Pricing” (with Peter
Cramton), Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of Maryland, June
1999, forthcoming, Economic Theory.
(74 KB)
“Auctioning
Securities” (with Peter Cramton),
Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of Maryland, March 1998.
(53 KB)
“On
Generalizing the English Auction,” Working Paper, Department of Economics, University of
Maryland, December 1997. (57 KB). Superceded by “Ascending
Auctions with Package Bidding” (with Paul
Milgrom).
“Synergies in
Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions” (with Peter
Cramton, R. Preston McAfee, and
John McMillan), Journal of Economics
and
Management Strategy, Vol. 6, No. 3, Fall 1997, pp. 497-527. (892 KB)
“An
Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects,” Working Paper No.
97-06, Department of Economics, University of
Maryland, June 1997. (207 KB)
“Demand
Reduction and Inefficiency in Multi-Unit Auctions” (with Peter
Cramton), Working Paper No. 96-07, Department of Economics, University of
Maryland, July 1996. (154 KB)
“An
Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction for Dissimilar Objects,” Working Paper,
Department of Economics, University of
Maryland, January 1996. (66 KB)
“Insider
Trading in a Rational Expectations Economy,” American Economic
Review, Vol. 80, No. 5, December 1990, pp. 1022-1041.
Patents
“System
and Method for an Efficient Dynamic Multi-Unit Auction,” U.S. Patent
Number 7,165,046, issued 16 January 2007. (1,767 KB)
“System
and Method for an Efficient Dynamic Multi-Unit Auction,” U.S. Patent
Number 7,062,461, issued 13 June 2006. (1,660 KB)
“System
and Method for an Efficient Dynamic Auction for Multiple Objects,” U.S. Patent
Number 6,026,383, issued 15 Feb 2000. (918 KB)
“Computer
Implemented Methods and Apparatus for Auctions,” U.S. Patent
Number 6,021,398, issued 1 Feb 2000, this file only contains the pages that
differ from the 5,905,975 patent. (433 KB)
“Computer
Implemented Methods and Apparatus for Auctions,” U.S. Patent
Number 5,905,975, issued 18 May 1999. (709 KB)
