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Bargaining Papers

“Bargaining with Incomplete Information,” (with Peter Cramton and Raymond Deneckere), Chapter 50 of Handbook of Game Theory, (R. Aumann and S. Hart, eds), Vol. 3, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science B.V., 2002.

“Efficient Sequential Bargaining” (with Raymond Deneckere), Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 60, No. 2, April 1993, pp. 435-461.

“Durable Goods Monopoly with Incomplete Information” (with Raymond Deneckere), supercedes “Stationary Sequential Equilibria in Bargaining with Two-Sided Incomplete Information,” Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 59, No. 4, October 1992, pp. 795-812.

“Bargaining and the Right to Remain Silent” (with Raymond Deneckere), Econometrica, Vol. 60, No. 3, May 1992, pp. 597-625.

“Reputation in Bargaining and Durable Goods Monopoly” (with Raymond Deneckere), Econometrica, Vol. 57, No. 3, May 1989, pp. 511-531; reprinted as Chapter 13 in Bargaining with Incomplete Information (P. Linhart, R. Radner, and M. Satterthwaite, eds.), Academic Press, 1992.

“One is Almost Enough for Monopoly” (with Raymond Deneckere), Rand Journal of Economics, Vol. 18, No. 2, Summer 1987, pp. 255-274.

2020 Lawrence M. Ausubel