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Syllabus for Economics 603
(second half)
Fall 2008–2009
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Official Matters
Economics 603 is the first semester of the Economics Department’s two-semester
core sequence in
Microeconomics. This course is taken by all first-year Economics Ph.D.
students, as well as by quite a few Ph.D. students in Agricultural &
Resource Economics, the Smith School
of Business, and other academic departments. The first half of the
semester treats consumer theory and the theory of the firm. The second
half of the semester is an introduction to game theory and its applications in
economics.
All official course announcements will
be posted on the course home page:
http://www.ausubel.com/econ603
Problem sets, handouts, transparencies and
online copies of readings (where available) will be posted on a
password-protected area:
http://www.ausubel.com/econ603/restricted
The login and password for the restricted area will be
announced in class.
There will be about 6 problem sets for the second
half of the course. For your reference, all of the previous year’s
problem sets are currently posted on the password-protected web page.
However, there will be some new questions added to some of
the problem sets. You should refer to the most recent version at the time of
doing the problem sets—the most recent version will be dated “Fall 2008-2009”.
There will be written solutions made available to the
problem sets—but your only source of solutions for one or two
questions from each problem set
will be to attend the weekly Discussion Sections.
The final exam—for both the morning and
afternoon sections—is scheduled for Monday December 15, 2008 from
10:30 am – 12:30 pm (location to be announced later).
Texts
R. Gibbons, Game Theory for
Applied Economists, Princeton Univ. Press, 1992 (paperback).
A. Mas-Colell, M. Whinston and J.
Green (henceforth “MWG”), Microeconomic Theory, Oxford Univ. Press, 1995.
Course Times
Section 0201: Tuesdays/Thursdays 11:00 am - 12:15
pm, Tydings 1114 Section
0101: Tuesdays/Thursdays 2:00 pm - 3:15 pm, Tydings 2111
Discussion Section 0101: Thursdays 3:30 pm - 5:00
pm, Tydings 1132 Discussion
Section 0201: Fridays 12 noon - 1:45 pm, Tydings 2111
Teaching Assistant: Oleg Baranov (baranov@econ.umd.edu)
Office Hours
Professor
Ausubel’s Office Hours: Tuesdays and Thursdays, 10:00 – 11:00 am, Tydings
4130C
Oleg Baranov’s
Office Hours: Fridays, 2:00 – 4:00 pm, Tydings
4118A
Topics for Second Half of Course (approximately two weeks per topic)
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Oligopoly and Static Games
of Complete Information
Gibbons, chapter 1 MWG,
pp. 943-953 (continuity, compactness, correspondences and fixed-point theorems)
MWG, pp. 383-400 (especially
pp. 395-400)
Tirole, J., “Product
Differentiation: Price Competition and Non-Price Competition,” chapter
7 of The Theory of Industrial Organization, MIT Press, 1988
[For a second reading (e.g.,
while preparing for comps): MWG, pp. 217-253 and 260-261.]
Problem Sets #7-8 Assigned
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Dynamic Games of Complete
Information
Gibbons, chapter 2
Rubinstein, A., “Perfect
Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model,” Econometrica, 1982, 97-109
[For a second reading
(e.g., while preparing for comps): MWG, pp. 267-282, 296-299, and 400-423.]
Supplemental reading:
Binmore,
K., “Making Deals,” chapter 5 of Fun and Games, D.C. Heath
& Co., 1992
Coase, R., “The Problem
of Social Cost,” Journal of Law and Economics, 1960
Problem Sets #9-10 Assigned
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Static Games of Incomplete
Information
Gibbons, chapter 3 Ausubel,
L. (2003), “Auction Theory for the New Economy” (short survey aimed
toward grad students)
[For a second reading
(e.g., while preparing for comps): MWG, pp. 253-260.]
Supplemental reading:
Milgrom,
P., “Auctions and Bidding: A Primer,” Journal of Economic
Perspectives, Summer 1989, 3-22
Ashenfelter, O., “How
Auctions Work for Wine and Art,” Journal of Economic Perspectives,
Summer 1989, 23-36
Vickrey, W., “Counterspeculation,
Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders,” Journal of Finance,
1961, 8-37
Ausubel, L., “An Efficient
Ascending-Bid Auction for Multiple Objects,” American Economic Review,
December 2004, 1452-1475
Cramton, P., “The FCC
Spectrum Auctions: An Early Assessment,” Journal of Economics &
Management Strategy, Fall 1997, 431-495
Problem Sets #11-12 Assigned
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Dynamic Games of
Incomplete Information
Gibbons, chapter 4 Spence,
A.M., “Job Market Signaling,” Quarterly Journal of Economics,
1973, 355-374
[For a second reading
(e.g., while preparing for comps): MWG, pp. 282-296 and 436-460.]
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Search Costs and Switch
Costs
Diamond, P., “A Model of
Price Adjustment,” Journal of Economic Theory, 1971, 156-168 Klemperer,
P., “Markets with Consumer Switching Costs,” Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 1987, 375-394
Ausubel, L., “The
Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market,” American Economic
Review, 1991, 50-81
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