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Economics 456: Law and Economics

Economics 456 is an undergraduate course in Law and Economics. Topics include: an overview of the legal system; property law (including intellectual property); tort law (especially product liability); contract law; insider trading law; and bankruptcy law. Professor Ausubel is not currently teaching Economics 456.

Economics 603: Microeconomic Theory

Economics 603 is the first half of the Economics Departments two-semester core sequence in Microeconomics. This course is taken by all first-year Economics Ph.D. students, as well as by quite a few Ph.D. students in Agricultural & Resource Economics, the Smith School of Business, and other academic departments. The first half of the semester treats consumer theory and the theory of the firm. The second half of the semester is an introduction to game theory and its applications in economics.

Economics 704: Advanced Microeconomics

Economics 704 is the second half of the Economics Departments two-semester sequence in Advanced Microeconomics. (Economics 703, the first half of the sequence, is taught by Professor Peter Cramton in the fall semester.) It is intended primarily for second-year Ph.D. students in Economics, the Business School, AREC, Computer Science and other related departments; and it regularly leads students into dissertation research. The course material varies from year to year, but in recent years, it has concentrated on the growing field of market design. As such, in Spring 2017, the course will focus on auction theory, matching theory, and the relationship between auction theory and matching theory. The auction theory component particularly focuses on the study of multi-unit auctions, including clock auctions and combinatorial auctions. The matching theory component contains treatments of one-to-one and many-to-one matching, including applications to the medical intern match, school choice, and kidney exchange. Every year, one or two topics which are timely and appear to be particularly fertile areas for research are selected for special emphasis. In 2017, four topics are under consideration for special emphasis: (1) the incorporation of classical revealed preference considerations into the design of practical auction and matching markets; (2) a recap of the Federal Communication Commissions “Incentive Auction,”; (3) the use of “obvious strategy-proofness” as a criterion in market design; and (4) applying insights of the sequential bargaining literature to matching markets.

2017 Lawrence M. Ausubel