April 2003
Curriculum
Vitae
LAWRENCE
M. AUSUBEL
Department
of Economics
University
of Maryland
Tydings
Hall, Room 3105
College
Park, MD 20742
301.405.3495
TEL 202.318.0863 FAX
2920
Garfield Terrace, N.W.
Washington,
DC 20008
Personal
Date
of Birth: December 9, 1959
Place
of Birth: New York City
Education
Ph.D.
(1984) Stanford University, Economics
M.L.S.
(1984) Stanford Law School, Legal
Studies
M.S.
(1982) Stanford University,
Mathematics
A.B.
(1980) Princeton University,
Mathematics
Honors: Phi Beta Kappa
Sigma Xi
Magna cum laude in
mathematics
Stanford University
Economics Department, graduate fellowship, 1982
Stanford Law School,
fellowship in law and economics, 1983
Fields of Concentration
Microeconomic
Theory and Game Theory
Auctions
and Bargaining
Industrial
Organization
Credit
Cards and Banking
Regulation
Law
and Economics
Professor
of Economics, University of Maryland (August 1992 – present).
Assistant
Professor of Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, Kellogg School,
Northwestern University (September 1984 – August 1992).
Visiting
Assistant Professor, New York University (January 1990 – May 1990).
Teaching
Fellow, variously in mathematics and economics, Stanford University (1981 –
83).
Teaching
Econ 456 Law
and Economics (Undergraduate; Maryland)
Econ 603 Microeconomic
Analysis (Ph.D.; Maryland)
Econ 661 Industrial
Organization (Ph.D.; Maryland)
Econ 704 Game
Theory, Bargaining and Auctions (Ph.D.; Maryland)
Mngrl Econ D30 Intermediate
Microeconomics (M.B.A.; Northwestern)
Mngrl Econ D45 Regulation
and Deregulation (M.B.A.; Northwestern)
Refereed Publications
“One
is Almost Enough for Monopoly” (with R. Deneckere), Rand Journal of
Economics, Vol. 18, No. 2, Summer 1987, pp. 255-274.
“Reputation
in Bargaining and Durable Goods Monopoly” (with R. Deneckere), Econometrica,
Vol. 57, No. 3, May 1989, pp. 511-531; reprinted as Chapter 13 in Bargaining
with Incomplete Information (P. Linhart, R. Radner, and M. Satterthwaite,
eds.), Academic Press, 1992.
“A
Direct Mechanism Characterization of Sequential Bargaining with One-Sided
Incomplete Information” (with R. Deneckere), Journal of Economic Theory,
Vol. 48, No. 1, June 1989, pp. 18-46; reprinted as Chapter 15 in Bargaining
with Incomplete Information (P. Linhart, R. Radner, and M. Satterthwaite,
eds.), Academic Press, 1992.
“Partially-Revealing
Rational Expectations Equilibrium in a Competitive Economy,” Journal of
Economic Theory, Vol. 50, No. 1, February 1990, pp. 93-126.
“Insider
Trading in a Rational Expectations Economy,” American Economic Review,
Vol. 80, No. 5, December 1990, pp. 1022-1041.
“The
Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market,” American Economic Review,
Vol. 81, No. 1, March 1991, pp. 50-81; reprinted as Chapter 21 in Advances
in Behavioral Finance (D. Thaler, ed.), Russell Sage Foundation, 1993.
“Bargaining and the Right to Remain Silent” (with R.
Deneckere), Econometrica, Vol. 60, No. 3, May 1992,
pp. 597-625.
“A
Generalized Theorem of the Maximum” (with R. Deneckere), Economic Theory,
Vol. 3, No. 1, January 1993, pp. 99-107.
“Durable
Goods Monopoly with Incomplete Information” (with R. Deneckere),
supercedes “Stationary Sequential Equilibria in Bargaining with Two-Sided
Incomplete Information,” Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 59, No. 4,
October 1992, pp. 795-812.
“Efficient
Sequential Bargaining” (with R. Deneckere), Review of Economic Studies,
Vol. 60, No. 2, April 1993, pp. 435-461.
“Credit
Card Defaults, Credit Card Profits, and Bankruptcy” American Bankruptcy Law
Journal, Vol. 71, Spring 1997, pp. 249-270; recipient of the Editor's
Prize for the best paper in the American Bankruptcy Law Journal, 1997.
“Synergies
in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions” (with Peter
Cramton, R. Preston McAfee, and John McMillan), Journal of Economics and
Management Strategy, Vol. 6, No. 3, Fall 1997, pp. 497-527.
“Bargaining
with Incomplete Information” (with P. Cramton and R. Deneckere), Chapter 50 of Handbook
of Game Theory, (R. Aumann and S. Hart, eds), Vol. 3, Amsterdam: Elsevier
Science B.V., 2002.
“Package Bidding: Vickrey vs. Ascending Auctions” (with
Paul Milgrom), Revue Economique, vol. 53, n° 3, May 2002.
“Implications of Auction Theory for New Issues Markets,” Brookings-Wharton
Papers on Financial Services, Vol. V, 2002.
“Ascending Auctions with Package Bidding” (with Paul
Milgrom), Frontiers of Theoretical Economics, Vol. 1: No. 1,
Article 1. http://www.bepress.com/bejte/frontiers/vol1/iss1/art1
“Auction Theory for
the New Economy,” forthcoming in The New Economy Handbook,
edited by Derek C. Jones, Academic Press, 2003.
“Vickrey Auctions with Reserve
Pricing” (with Peter C. Cramton), mimeo, University of Maryland, June 1999,
forthcoming Economic Theory.
“An Efficient Ascending-Bid Auction
for Multiple Objects,” Working Paper No. 97-06, University of Maryland, August
2002, forthcoming, American Economic Review.
Patents
“Computer
Implemented Methods and Apparatus for Auctions,” U.S. Patent Number 5,905,975,
issued May 18, 1999.
“Computer
Implemented Methods and Apparatus for Auctions,” U.S. Patent Number 6,021,398,
issued Feb. 1, 2000.
“System
and Method for an Efficient Dynamic Auction for Multiple Objects,” U.S. Patent
Number 6,026,383, issued Feb. 15, 2000.
Book Reviews and
Encyclopedia Entries
“Credit
Cards,” New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance, Stockton Press,
1992.
“Credit
Cards,” McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of Economics, McGraw-Hill, 1994.
“Book
Review: The Credit Card Industry, by
Lewis Mandell,” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 30, No. 3,
September 1992, pp. 1517-18.
Working Papers
“Demand Reduction and Inefficiency
in Multi-Unit Auctions” (with Peter Cramton), Working Paper No. 96-07,
University of Maryland, July 2002.
“An Efficient Dynamic Auction for Heterogeneous
Commodities,” mimeo, University of Maryland, July 2002; revised and resubmitted
to American Economic Review.
“A Mechanism Generalizing the
Vickrey Auction,” mimeo, University of Maryland, September 1999.
“Informal Bankruptcy” (with Amanda
E. Dawsey), mimeo, University of Maryland, January 2001.
“Adverse Selection in the Credit
Card Market,” mimeo, University of Maryland, June 1999; revise and
resubmit at American Economic Review.
“The Ascending Auction Paradox”
(with Jesse Schwartz), mimeo, University of Maryland, July 1999.
“The Optimality of Being Efficient”
(with Peter C. Cramton), mimeo, University of Maryland, June 1999.
“The
Credit Card Market, Revisited,” mimeo, University of Maryland, July 1995.
“Sequential
Recontracting Under Incomplete Information” (with A. Sen), mimeo, University of
Maryland, June 1995.
“Separation
and Delay in Bargaining” (with R. Deneckere), mimeo, University of Maryland,
April 1994.
“A Model of Managerial Discretion and Corporate Takeovers,” mimeo, University of Maryland, March 1993.
“Rigidity
and Asymmetric Adjustment of Bank Interest Rates,” mimeo, University of
Maryland, August 1992.
“Oligopoly
When Market Share Matters,” mimeo, Stanford University, May 1984.
“Partially-Revealing
Equilibria,” Stanford University, Department of Economics,
August 1984. Dissertation
committee: Mordecai Kurz (principal
advisor); Peter J. Hammond; Kenneth J. Arrow.
Works
in Progress
“Bargaining
and Forward Induction” (with R. Deneckere)
Research Grants
Principal
Investigator, “Multiple Item Auctions” (with P. Cramton), National Science
Foundation Grant SES-01-12906, July 15, 2001 – June 30, 2004.
Principal
Investigator, “Auctions for Multiple Items” (with P. Cramton), National Science
Foundation Grant SBR-97-31025, April 1, 1998 – March 31, 2001.
Co-Principal
Investigator, “Auctions and Infrastructure Conference” (with P. Cramton),
National Science Foundation, April 1, 1998 – March 31, 1999.
Principal
Investigator, “Bargaining Power, Sequential Recontracting, and the
Principal-Agent Problem” (with A. Sen), National Science Foundation Grant SBR‑94‑10545,
October 15, 1994 – September 30, 1997.
Principal
Investigator, “Insider Trading and Economic Efficiency,”
The Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, May 15, 1989 – May
14, 1992.
Principal
Investigator, “Bargaining with One- and Two-Sided Incomplete Information” (with
R. Deneckere), National Science Foundation Grant SES-86-19012,
June 1, 1987 – May 31, 1989.
Principal
Investigator, “Information Transmission in Bargaining and Markets” (with R.
Deneckere), National Science Foundation Grant IST-86-09129,
July 1, 1986 – June 30, 1987.
Recent Conferences
“On
Generalizing the English Auction,” Econometric Society Winter Meetings,
Chicago, January 1998.
“The
Optimality of Being Efficient,” Maryland Auction Conference, Wye River, May
1998.
“Adverse
Selection in the Credit Card Market,” Western Finance Association, Monterey,
June 1998.
“The
Optimality of Being Efficient,” Econometric Society Summer Meetings, Montreal,
June 1998.
“Bargaining
and Forward Induction,” Northwestern Summer Microeconomics Conference,
Evanston, IL, July 1998.
“Predicting
Personal Bankruptcies,” National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges, Dallas,
October 1998.
“Adverse
Selection in the Credit Card Market,” NBER Behavioral Macroeconomics
Conference, Boston, December 1998.
“The
Ascending Auction Paradox,” Econometric Society Summer Meetings, Madison,
June 1999.
“Adverse
Selection in the Credit Card Market,” Econometric Society Summer Meetings,
Madison, June 1999.
“Predicting
Personal Bankruptcies,” Meeting of the National Association of Chapter Thirteen
Trustees, New York, July 1999.
“The
Ascending Auction Paradox,” Southeast Economic Theory Conference, Washington
DC, November 1999.
“Adverse
Selection in the Credit Card Market,” Utah Winter Finance Conference, Salt Lake
City, February 2000.
“An
Efficient Dynamic Auction for Heterogeneous Commodities,” Conference on
Auctions and Market Structure, Heidelberg, Germany, July 2000.
“An
Efficient Dynamic Auction for Heterogeneous Commodities,” Conference on
Multiunit Auctions, Stony Brook, NY, July 2000.
“A
Mechanism Generalizing the Vickrey Auction,” Econometric Society World
Congress, Seattle, August 2000.
“Auctions
for Financial E-Commerce,” New York Federal Reserve Bank Conference on
Financial E-Commerce, New York, February 2001.
“An
Efficient Dynamic Auction for Heterogeneous Commodities,” NSF General
Equilibrium Conference, Providence, RI, April 2001.
“An
Efficient Dynamic Auction for Heterogeneous Commodities,” NSF/NBER
Decentralization Conference, Evanston, IL, April 2001.
“Informal
Bankruptcy,” Association of American Law Schools Workshop on Bankruptcy, St.
Louis, MO, May 2001.
“An
Efficient Dynamic Auction for Heterogeneous Commodities,” Econometric Society
Summer Meetings, College Park, MD, June 2001.
“Ascending
Auctions with Package Bidding,” FCC, SIEPR and NSF Conference on Combinatorial
Auctions, Wye River, MD, October 2001.
“The
Electricité de France Generation Capacity Auctions,” CORE-ECARES-LEA Workshop
on Auctions, Brussels, Belgium, November 2001.
“Informal
Bankruptcy,” Utah Winter Finance Conference, Salt Lake City, February 2002.
“Defictionalizing
the Walrasian Auctioneer,” Conference on Market Design in Honor of Robert
Wilson, Stanford, CA, May 2002.
“Adverse
Selection in the Credit Card Market,” Conference on the Economics of Payment
Networks, Toulouse, France, June 2002.
“Ascending
Auctions with Package Bidding,” Econometric Society Summer Meetings,
Los Angeles, June 2002.
“An
Efficient Dynamic Auction for Heterogeneous Commodities,” Conference in Honor
of Mordecai Kurz, Stanford, CA, August 2002.
“Adverse
Selection in the Credit Card Market,” Conference on Credit, Trust and Calculation,
San Diego, November 2002.
“Package
Bidding for Spectrum Auctions,” American Economic Association Meetings,
Washington, DC, January 2003.
Professional Service
Associate Editor, Economic Theory, 2003 – .
Guest Associate Editor, Management Science, issue
on Electronic Auctions, 2003.
Program Chair of the 2001 North American Summer Meeting
of the Econometric Society (with Peter Cramton), University of Maryland, June
21–24, 2001.
Program Committee of the North American Summer Meeting of
the Econometric Society, UCLA, June 2002, and University of Pennsylvania, June
1991.
Organized Maryland Auction Conference (with Peter
Cramton), Wye River Conference Center, May 1998, sponsored by the National
Science Foundation, the World Bank, and the University of Maryland.
Spoke at a Forum on Bankruptcy of the Financial Services Committee of the United States House of Representatives, February 28, 2001.
Testified before the Subcommittee on Commercial and Administrative Law of the United States House of Representatives, Hearing on the Consumer Bankruptcy Issues in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, March 10, 1998.
Testified
before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Regulatory Relief of the
United States Senate, Hearing on Bankruptcy Reform, February 11, 1998.
Testified
before the National Bankruptcy Review Commission, January 1997.
Referee for: American Economic
Review, Econometrica, European Economic Review, Games and
Economic Behavior, International Journal of Game Theory, International
Journal of Industrial Organization, Journal of Banking and Finance, Journal
of Business, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Financial
Intermediation, Journal of Political Economy, Quarterly Journal
of Economics, Rand Journal of Economics, Review of Economic
Studies, and the National Science Foundation.
American Economic Association
Econometric Society
Society for the Promotion of Economic Theory